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We discuss research on discrimination against blacks and other racial minorities in labor market outcomes,
highlighting fundamental challenges faced by empirical work in this area. Specifically, for work devoted
to measuring whether and how much discrimination exists, we discuss how the absence of relevant
data, the potential noncomparability of blacks and whites, and various conceptual concerns peculiar
to race may frustrate or render impossible the application of empirical methods used in other areas
of study. For work seeking to arbitrate empirically between the two main alternative theoretical explanations
for such discrimination as it exists, we distinguish between indirect analyses, which do not directly
study the variation in prejudice or the variation in information, the mechanisms at the heart of the two
types of models we review, and direct analyses, which are more recent and much less common. We
highlight problems with both approaches. Throughout, we discuss recent work, which, the various
challenges notwithstanding, permits tentative conclusions about discrimination. We conclude by pointing
to areas that might be fruitful avenues for future investigation.
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The U.S. Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s led to the eradication of various 
exclusionary policies, laws, and institutions that had long limited the life prospects of racial 
minorities. Differences between blacks and whites in many outcomes have since narrowed 
sharply, but some gaps remain stubbornly persistent, including large differences in labor market 
outcomes such as wages and employment probabilities. One possible explanation for these 
differences in labor market outcomes might be the continued presence of racial differences in 
various dimensions of skill; there remain, for example, disturbingly large racial differences in 
various measures of educational attainment and cognitive skill (Neal 2006). Another possible 
explanation for the remaining labor market outcome differences may be labor market 
discrimination, meaning that blacks may receive lower labor market returns relative to similarly 
productive whites. 
This article identifies and discusses various challenges that, in our view, frustrate 
empirical research on racial labor market discrimination.
1 Much like the discrimination literature 
more generally, we focus on discrimination against blacks.
2 We also discuss some recent 
empirical discrimination studies that feature relatively novel approaches for dealing with the 
challenges to discrimination research that we outline. The article is not, and does not attempt to 
provide, a comprehensive review of the vast discrimination literature. We therefore do not 
reproduce a comprehensive summary of various theoretical models of discrimination, so ably 
provided by Lang & Lehmann (2010). Nor do we thoroughly list the huge set of empirical 
findings in this literature as such a summary would be too long for the purposes of the article and 
may readily be found elsewhere (see Cain 1986, Darity & Mason 1998, Altonji & Blank 1999). 
Empirical work on discrimination generally applies microeconometric methods to 
individual-level data, eschewing methods such as calibration. The literature tries to answer two 
questions: First, how much discrimination in outcomes such as wages is there against blacks? 
Second, what theoretical model, or set of models, best accounts for such labor market 
discrimination as it exists? Research on either question confronts a number of major challenges, 
which we discuss in turn. 2 
We focus first on the difficulty of measuring the degree of labor market discrimination 
against blacks. The main problem this line of inquiry confronts is that, in observational data, 
individuals of different races may systematically differ with respect to other determinants of 
labor market outcomes apart from race, including some that are unobserved. Individual cross-
racial comparisons may thus involve persons who are not otherwise equal, rendering conclusions 
about discrimination invalid. The possible presence of omitted-variables bias bedevils most 
microeconometric work seeking to make causal inference, and economists have developed a 
variety of methods to address it. However, we argue that various concerns peculiar to the case of 
race render the use of these methods imperfect for measuring discrimination. In particular, we 
discuss the generally ignored conceptual problem of accurate racial classification, concerns about 
limited data availability, and the near-impossibility of experimental or quasi-experimental 
research designs in the context of studies of race. We present some strategies used in recent work 
to circumvent some of these problems and explain why, despite these interesting and innovative 
efforts, the question of how much discrimination there is in the labor market against blacks 
remains somewhat controversial. 
We move next to a critical assessment of efforts to determine which theoretical 
framework best explains existing discrimination. Two classes of models dominate modern 
theoretical work on labor market discrimination. Prejudice models emphasize the presence of 
negative preference in the utility function of key labor market actors. The earliest and perhaps 
most influential versions of these models assume perfect labor markets, but subsequent models 
often assume the presence of frictions associated with either random or directed search. 
Statistical discrimination models emphasize the role of limited information in labor market 
transactions.
3 Papers purporting to test these two classes of models typically conduct what we 
consider to be indirect assessments—that is, they measure whether particular aspects of wage or 
employment-differentials distributions are consistent with the predictions of the model being 
tested. 
Indirect tests, in the sense that we use the term, are ubiquitous in economics, so we raise 
no objection to them on this basis. The problem with indirect tests in the context of 
discrimination is that the two predominant types of discrimination models often yield similar 
predictions about labor market differentials. Indirect approaches to testing between 
discrimination models are thus ultimately only convincing to the degree that the particular 3 
finding about labor market outcome differences is explicable exclusively by one of the models 
and not by some version of the other class of discrimination models. In our view, this challenge 
is rarely met, especially because of the variety of insightful versions of the two basic classes of 
models that have now appeared in the literature, examples of which we discuss below. 
Rather than using an indirect approach of examining a model’s ultimate predictions about 
labor market outcomes, an alternative strategy would be to test the specific mechanism—
prejudice or information limitations—by which the model implies those outcomes are generated. 
Data to conduct this type of direct analysis are generally not readily available in the data sources 
most commonly used by economists, and available measures do not always perfectly line up with 
the theoretical construct outlined in a chosen model.
 These are serious challenges, but some 
recent work has nonetheless conducted exactly this kind of direct assessment, especially for 
prejudice models.
4  We describe results of this work and address some questions and concerns 
they raise. 
In the final section of the paper, we selectively discuss other recent work that has 
appeared since the most recent comprehensive review of the empirical literature. We identify 
themes uniting these new analyses and some questions—both theoretical and empirical—that we 
believe have received too little attention in the literature, ending the discussion with ideas for 
future work. 
2. ASSESSING HOW MUCH RACIAL DISCRIMINATION EXISTS IN THE LABOR 
MARKET 
2.1. Basic Setup 
Empirical work seeking to measure the extent of labor market racial discrimination usually starts 
with a simple statistical model in which an individual i with observable traits Xit and 
unobservable characteristics  it   receives wages (or some other labor market outcome) y at time t 
given by 
yit  Xit Bi  it.         ( 1 )  
Here the binary variable Bi indicates the person’s race and equals 1 if he is black. The parameter 
  answers the ceteris paribus question of how, given the statistical model, an individual’s wages 4 
would be different if he were black instead of white but otherwise remained exactly the same. 
Equivalently,   measures how two different persons, one black and one white but otherwise 
identical, would differ in terms of their wages. By either view,   represents labor market 
discrimination against blacks. Various modifications of this basic specification might be 
imagined. For example, there is no i subscript on the term  , so Equation 1 ignores the 
possibility that discrimination may be heterogeneous across blacks (see Heckman et al. 1999 for 
a discussion of heterogeneous treatment effects).
5 And the formulation in Equation 1 assumes 
that the various determinants of wages enter the regression equation linearly and additively. 
Considerations such as heterogeneous effects or rich interaction effects are undoubtedly 
important, but we ignore discussion of them with the aim of focusing on concerns we think are 
more fundamental challenges for measuring discrimination. 
The regression given in Equation 1 is identical to the standard specification in the 
program evaluation or policy evaluation literature. In the language of that literature, being black 
 or 1 i B   is the treatment in Equation 1, and the analysis aims to measure  , the causal effect 
of that treatment. As in the program evaluation area more generally, the key challenge to 
estimating   using data on a sample of blacks and whites is the econometric difficulty posed by 
the possible correlation between Bi and the unobservables it. In particular, a regression 
performed on Equation 1 for a sample of blacks and whites will produce a biased estimate of   
unless race is independent of the unobservables  ,   conditional on the observablesX , or 
Cov Bi,it Xit   0.         ( 2 )  
The implication of the requirement of the race variable’s conditional independence is 
that, in general, estimates of discrimination based on comparisons using observational data will 
be biased unless all determinants of the outcome that remain unobserved after conditioning on 
observable controls are on average equal for blacks and whites, or 
E it Bi 1,Xit      E it Bi  0,Xit    .      ( 3 )  
The conditional independence assumption is of course impossible to test, but it is easy to 
think of unobserved wage determinants, of which blacks and whites probably have different 
amounts because of U.S. racial history.
6 Empirical scholars have developed various tools to deal 5 
with violations of the conditional independence assumption. Before discussing the application 
and limitations of these methods, we discuss challenges peculiar to the treatment variable “being 
black” in Equation 1 that simply do not arise in other program evaluation problems. These 
considerations impose what we call a taxonomical challenge on efforts to measure 
discrimination, affecting both the analyses that can be done and the inferences that may be drawn 
from them. 
2.2. The Taxonomical Challenge 
In coding the variable  i B , economists generally assign individuals to one of a few mutually 
exclusive racial categories, based either on the agent’s self-report about race on a survey or on 
the race the individual is assigned by an outside observer such as a survey interviewer. What do 
designations such as black, white, or Latino mean? The view among biologists appears to be that 
they have no meaningful biological significance. And the prevailing convention in all the 
humanities and other social sciences besides economics is that race is entirely socially 
constructed, meaning that the racial bins into which people are sorted at a point in time are 
essentially merely arbitrary divisions, which can change over time or contexts (e.g., see Lopez 
1994 for a discussion of the biological versus social construction of race). 
To these arguments made by other types of scholars, economists might reasonably 
respond that the coarse definitions they use unarguably represent commonly understood and 
historically important groupings. People routinely report their race on surveys, suggesting that 
they understand perfectly well what is being asked of them. Persons commonly referred to and 
who call themselves black or white disproportionately possess particular readily identifiable 
phenotypic traits such as certain types of skin coloration and hair texture, common to people 
whose ancestry can be traced, at least in part, to particular regions in the world (e.g., Africa for 
blacks, Europe for whites).
7 And the different racial bins into which people are sorted on the 
basis of these (admittedly superficial) characteristics have each been subject to a particular array 
of influences and experiences. Given these points, racial designations as applied in empirical 
work in economics are not obviously controversial. These designations denote membership in 
particular groups, characterized by a distinct set of experiences, culture, and broadly shared 
physical traits. These classifications are taken to be permanent and ascriptive, in that they are 6 
part of an individual’s endowment and different from attributes such as years of schooling or 
place of residence, which agents partly choose. 
But does this reasonable definition of racial classification satisfy the conditions generally 
understood about a treatment in the treatment effects literature? An unstated condition in that 
literature is that the analyst can characterize each observation as having received (or at least as 
having been assigned to) the treatment or not. The treatment may differ in degree, as in dosage-
type studies, but it is presumed to not differ in type—meaning that each treated observation can 
be regarded as having received the same, widely understood, and agreed-upon thing. These 
conditions obviously hold for treatments such as a participant in a job-training program or a 
student in a small class, but matters are not as clear when the treatment is a person’s race. 
Precisely because race incorporates both a superficial physical aspect and something having to 
do with background or life experiences, two persons who differ markedly in their physical traits 
might, because of the essentially identical backgrounds from which they come, both characterize 
themselves as black, even if some third person might consider this to be true for only one of 
them. Or persons who appear indistinguishable from each other to an observer might consider 
themselves to come from different racial groups because of their vastly different life experiences. 
Built into the notion of race, therefore, is the problem that the analyst’s presumption 
about whether an agent has received the treatment—whether the agent is or is not black—may 
differ from what others believe about that agent. A person calling herself black, who is so noted 
by the analyst, may not be regarded as black by the market actors with whom she interacts, and 
vice versa. Because discrimination research aims to determine whether people are treated 
differently by various market actors because of their race, knowing the race that observers 
ascribe to an individual would seem an important precondition for calling differential treatment 
discrimination. Having information about the race the individual calls herself is not a guarantee 
against this concern; it is at least theoretically possible that racial self-reports might differ from 
observer beliefs about race. It is, moreover, theoretically possible that either self- or observer 
racial classifications may change over time or contexts, further frustrating efforts to call observed 
differential racial outcomes racial discrimination. 
An active research program outside of economics suggests that these issues may be more 
than mere theoretical concerns.
8 A literature in sociology suggests that racial self-classification 7 
may be sensitive to a number of considerations: the way that the question is posed or the range of 
options presented to the respondent (Farley 2002, Snipp 2003); the location of interviews with 
racial questions, as shown in the analysis by Harris & Sim (2002) of teenagers interviewed at 
home and at school; and possible societal changes that augment racial pride, as has been 
suggested about the massive and unexplained increase in the number of Americans describing 
themselves as American Indian after 1960 (Nagel 1995). 
A particularly noteworthy recent example in this area is the work by Saperstein & Penner 
(2010) studying racial classification in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY). In this 
well-known panel data set, which spans more than two decades, individuals were asked to report 
their own race in 1979 and later in 2002. In addition, survey interviewers recorded what they (the 
interviewers) took the respondent’s race to be after the interview was completed in 19 
consecutive surveys. Saperstein & Penner show that for fully 20% of the sample, there was at 
least one change (and often many more) in interviewer racial classification of the same 
respondent across years. The authors also document many changes in racial self-reports between 
the 1979 and 2002 responses. 
The data allow the authors to carefully examine the notion that these changes might be 
the result of random miscoding. Various pieces of evidence sharply undercut this possibility, 
including the remarkable stability of interviewer coding about respondent gender and the fact 
that particular types of changes in self-classification are associated with particular life episodes 
in the intervening years. For example, they show that among persons who said they were white 
in 1979, those who did not have a bout of incarceration at some point in the intervening 20 years 
again reported themselves as white in 2002 at a rate of 95%, while those who had been 
subsequently incarcerated described themselves as white at the later date at only a rate of 81%, 
with 8% calling themselves black in the later year. 
Following on these results, we examine the consistency of racial self-reports in the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), another data source frequently used by economists to study 
racial differences. The CPS question used to code respondents’ race was changed between 
December 2002 and January 2003.
9 The 2002 question offered respondents four possible 
answers: White, Black, American Indian/Aleut/Eskimo, or Asian/Pacific Islander. The 2003 
question allowed respondents to choose as many options as they desired from a much longer list 8 
of possible races. Because CPS respondents are surveyed eight times over the course of 16 
months, we observe responses for some individuals who were asked both race questions. We 
examine individuals whose first outgoing rotation month was in 2002 and whose final outgoing 
rotation month was in 2003 and follow the methods of Madrian & Lefgren (1999) to match 
observations across CPS waves. Specifically, we first match by household identifier and person 
line number. We then discard observations if there is not a match on gender, if age increases by 
more than two years between 2002 and 2003, and if reported years of education are lower in 
2003 than in 2002. Madrian & Lefgren also discard cases in which the race response does not 
match; given our desire to measure how this variable changes, we obviously do not discard these 
cases. 
Table 1 presents cross-tabulations of responses to the two race questions.  Responses to 
the 2002 question are summarized in the columns, and each row reports the response by what the 
approach takes to be the same individuals to the 2003 question. The bottom panel of the table 
shows the fraction giving the same or different reports in both years. Two patterns are 
immediately noticeable. First, a large majority of individuals listed the same single race in 2003, 
when there was the option of listing many races, as the race they reported in 2002, when they 
were limited to a single choice. Second, there was substantial change over time, especially 
among racial minority groups, in own racial classification. Among those describing themselves 
as black in 2002, 6.7% say they are white (and only white) a year later when given the choice to 
list multiple races. Furthermore, 8.6% of blacks report something other than being only black 
when offered the choice of multiple race reports. The variation is even greater among 
Asian/Pacific Islanders and American Indian/Aleut/Eskimos. For example, among those 
reporting being Asian/Pacific Islanders in 2002, 11.2% report being white in 2003, and nearly 
25% report something other than being only Asian/Pacific Islander. 
Unlike the Saperstein & Penner NLSY results mentioned above, which come from a large 
panel data set in which respondents are tracked carefully over many years, the changing racial 
designations in the CPS may actually merely reflect our inability to accurately match 
respondents across CPS waves. It is possible to assess the extent to which mismatching of 
individuals across years of the CPS might be responsible for these results by performing a 
benchmark analysis for gender. Specifically, we matched outgoing rotation observations in the 
same way as in the race exercise except that we did not drop observations that were mismatched 9 
on gender. We find from this analysis that only 0.4% of the pairs reported a different gender in 
the two waves of the CPS. As we should expect that about half of any randomly matched pairs of 
individuals would be of the same gender, this suggests that about 0.8% of the sample might be 
matched to different individuals in the two waves of the CPS. This estimate of the mismatch rate 
is an order of magnitude smaller than the fraction of blacks in 2002 who report something other 
than black in 2003, strongly suggesting that the different race responses are by the same person. 
At the very minimum, the results about changing racial classification in commonly used 
data sets raise some doubt about the notion that race is a fixed trait and should give pause to the 
scholar of discrimination. Conceptually, what does it mean to say that blacks are or are not 
discriminated against if individuals who say that they are black, or who are coded as black by 
observers, in one time period report or are given a different racial classification at another? 
If the changing racial classification depicted in Table 1 or the likelihood of classification 
disagreements at a point in time were random, estimates of the extent of discrimination will 
probably be downward biased.
10 But there is some evidence that the type of racial classification a 
person gives in survey data may be related to observable characteristics—at least among blacks. 
Above we note the correlation between the propensity to call one’s self black and incarceration 
found in the NLSY. Table 2 shows the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that 
relate the propensity to report a single race in 2003 to individual characteristics in the CPS.  
Columns 1 and 2 show results for those who report being black in 2002; the dependent variable 
is an indicator for reporting black only in 2003. Columns 3 and 4 show results for those who 
report being white in 2002; the dependent variable is an indicator for reporting white only in 
2003. All regressions include only observations for which valid wage observations exist in both 
2002 and 2003. 
The results in column 1 indicate that among those reporting being black in 2002, 
conditional on log wages measured in 2002, educational attainment is positively related to the 
choice to identify as being only black in 2003. However, conditional on educational attainment, 
log wages are insignificantly negatively related to reporting being only black in 2003. The 
regression in column 2 adds a control for the increase in log wages between 2002 and 2003. 
Adding this control sharpens the difference in estimated coefficients on log wages and education. 
Both are significant, although opposite in sign, and the coefficient on wage growth is also 10 
negative and significant. It is also interesting to compare the results for blacks with those for 
whites, shown in columns 3 and 4. Just as for blacks, education positively predicts reporting a 
single race for whites when given the choice of multiple race responses. However, whereas the 
opposite is true for blacks, conditional on education, both the level and growth in log wages 
positively predict reporting being only white in 2003. 
Further analysis is necessary before any definitive conclusions can be drawn about the 
meaning of these estimates, especially given the possible mismatch problems in the CPS. 
However, these results hint at the possibility that the propensity to self-report a particular racial 
designation may be correlated with the level of growth or wages or with things (such as 
schooling) that are related to wages. If true, this means that the treatment variable race in 
Equation 1 may be endogenous with respect to labor market outcomes, with effects on the 
estimates of discrimination that are not obvious. An important task for future empirical work on 
discrimination will be to more thoroughly explore changing racial classification and to examine 
the theoretical issue of what determines racial identification. Here insights from the interesting 
body of theoretical work on identity and people’s choice of racial and other putatively immutable 
ascriptive traits (Fang & Loury 2005, Akerlof & Kranton 2000) may be quite useful. 
2.3. Limitations of Experimental Estimates 
Leaving aside any concerns about the possibly fluid and selective nature of racial classification, 
and supposing henceforth that racial designation captures an immutable and perfectly understood 
construct, the key challenge for the empirical scholar measuring discrimination is how to 
estimate   in the face of possible violations of Equation 2 or 3. Of course, the only way to 
guarantee conditional independence of the treatment variable in a framework such as Equation 1 
is by running an experiment, in which there is random assignment to different values of the 
treatment variable. For this reason, an experiment with controlled random assignment is widely 
considered the gold-standard method for answering ex post questions about the causal effect of a 
treatment.
11 When the analyst is unable to conduct an experiment, it is often possible to at least 
conceive of a mechanism by which treatment could be experimentally manipulated or to imagine 
that there might exist situations in which the random assignment forthcoming from an actual 
experiment is effectively produced by some natural feature of the environment. 11 
For studies of discrimination, however, there exists no realistic possibility of randomly 
varying individuals’ race nor is there any likelihood that a natural experiment that does the same 
thing might be discovered. Even if it were possible to change the phenotypic correlates of race 
such as skin color or hair texture, no responsible social scientists would undertake this 
endeavor.
12 
Randomly varying a person’s race is not even a well-formed idea in the first place. It is 
not clear that persons whose skin color or hair texture had been changed (were such 
manipulation possible or moral) would be black, given that racial designation indicates some 
notion of shared culture or life experiences with a particular group. Furthermore, even if it were 
possible to randomly manipulate race, it is not clear which characteristics it would be correct to 
manipulate and which should be held constant. To answer this question, it is necessary to define 
precisely what race is, something that has not been settled, as discussed above. But if it is 
impossible to say which individual characteristics should be held constant and which should be 
randomly varied in a hypothetical experiment designed to estimate the effect of race on wages, 
how are we to make the same decisions when running an OLS regression for the same purpose? 
For both practical and conceptual considerations, the gold-standard method of measuring 
the causal effect of an individual being of a different race is ruled out to the scholar of 
discrimination. Moreover, that one cannot even conceive of an ideal experiment in the realm of 
the hypothetical implies that the causal question itself may not be well specified. 
Whereas experimental modification of an individual’s race is impossible, random 
manipulation of an observer’s beliefs or knowledge about the racial classification of an agent 
with whom that observer interacts is something social scientists can do.
13 One could, for 
example, imagine researchers randomly telling some subset of market actors that a person of 
superficially indeterminate race is in fact black and telling another subset that the person is 
white. A comparison across these groups in their treatment of the individual would provide some 
evidence about whether those actors discriminated against people they thought to be black.
14 
Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004) essentially conduct exactly this type of analysis in their 
study of firms’ treatment of résumés sent in for entry-level job applications. Bertrand & 
Mullainathan find that résumés that had been randomly given “black-sounding” names as 
opposed to “white-sounding” ones, but that were otherwise the same, were significantly less 12 
likely to receive call backs. A fair reading of these results is that firms engage in discrimination 
against applicants thought to be black. 
The experimental methods employed in this well-known and imaginative paper might not 
completely circumvent concerns about omitted-variables bias. In particular, conditional 
independence requires that the only thing that changes in an observer’s mind upon examining a 
résumé with a distinctively black-sounding name is the belief that the person to whom the 
résumé refers is black. If instead the observer happens to believe that people with distinctively 
black names are also distinguished by other productivity-relevant traits, differential behavior 
toward résumés with black-sounding names may be the result of a change in beliefs about those 
other traits.
15 Or, because the most-black-sounding names are unorthodox in the distribution of 
all names encountered in the United States, one cannot be sure whether it is the (assumed) race 
of the agent that generates the differential treatment or the fact that the observer treats those with 
unorthodox names differently. Either behavior would represent a type of discrimination, but 
discrimination in the latter case would not be racial in nature. 
Bertrand & Mullainathan’s paper may be read as an extension of the traditional audit-
study approach to measuring discrimination. In a typical audit study, the analyst measures the 
extent to which subjects of different races or genders are treated differently by randomly selected 
employers or landlords to whom these subjects are sent to seek jobs or to rent or buy homes (e.g., 
see Yinger 1986, Mincy 1993, Darity & Mason 1998, Neumark et al. 1996). Many of these 
studies document that black subjects in these transactions receive worse outcomes (e.g., lower 
wages, smaller likelihood of job offers). The use of audit-study approaches to measure 
discrimination has been sharply criticized, most notably by Heckman & Siegelman (1993) and 
Heckman (1998). One critique is the possibility that, despite the best efforts of the study 
designer, there is no way to be absolutely certain that the subjects (perhaps unwittingly) do not 
exhibit some behavior in their interactions with firms or landlords that has an independent effect 
on how those firms act toward them. This problem may be present whether audit pairs are 
randomized to various firms or not. Because Bertrand & Mullainathan never send an actual 
person to firms, but rather only the inanimate and perfectly controllable résumé, this is not a 
concern in their study. 13 
Bertrand & Mullainathan’s paper might be more affected by a second complaint made by 
critics of conventional audit studies. The criticism asserts that, even if selected firms discriminate 
against blacks sent to them randomly, this differential treatment need not measure the labor 
market discrimination blacks experience in equilibrium. The presence of discriminatory firms 
might cause blacks to adopt different job-search strategies than whites, leading them to perhaps 
send more résumés out than would otherwise identical whites. Alternatively, blacks might be 
expected in equilibrium to sort themselves across firms, minimizing their contact with especially 
discriminatory ones. As we discuss at greater length below, existing models suggest that market 
discrimination will be determined by the firm with which blacks interact at the margin. Because 
of considerations like this, audit results—even those based on random assignment as in Bertrand 
& Mullainathan’s study—may either understate or overstate racial equilibrium outcome 
differences. 
2.4. Limitations of Regression-Based (or Selection on Observables) Methods of Measuring 
Discrimination 
Given the challenges associated with using experimental methods to measure equilibrium labor 
market racial discrimination, it is not surprising that the most common approach in the literature 
relies on some form on regression-based procedure. The discussion in the previous section 
highlights that it is conceptually and practically difficult to even define which wage determinants 
should be categorized as being a part of race and which should be things to control for. If one 
could clearly delineate between the two and it were somehow possible to observe and control for 
all the other determinants of labor market outcomes besides race, conditional independence of 
the treatment variable Bi in the regression in Equation 1 would be assured (see Barnow et al. 
1980). Indeed, even if this condition is not met, so that the regression controls only for a large 
subset of additional determinants of market outcomes, there probably is still descriptive value in 
examining the estimates from regressions such as that in Equation 1, conditional on the variables 
  X  present in standard data sets. 
The neoclassical model of wage determination posits that workers are paid their marginal 
product. The default position of most economists is thus that unexplained differences in wages 
reflect differences in dimensions of skill not accounted for by the scholar, rather than providing 
evidence of discrimination. Indeed, a series of papers (e.g., O’Neill 1990, Maxwell 1994, 14 
Ferguson 1995) has shown that controlling for the most widely studied observable dimensions of 
skill, such as the amount or quality of formal schooling, reduces unexplained racial gaps in 
wages and other outcomes. In a well-known paper, Neal & Johnson (1996) relate racial wage 
gaps among young adults in the NLSY to a single measure of skill—the person’s adolescent 
score on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT). Neal & Johnson find that controlling for 
AFQT score dramatically lowers the unexplained gap in wages between blacks and whites and 
indeed causes it to disappear for some subgroups. Darity & Mason (1998) point out that there is 
no consensus about what the AFQT measures, with possibilities ranging from intelligence to 
school quality, and subsequent authors have found that when both years of schooling (measured 
at the time of the AFQT test or much later in life) and AFQT score are included in Neal & 
Johnson’s regressions, substantial racial wage gaps re-emerge (see Rodgers & Spriggs 1996, 
Carneiro et al. 2005, Lang & Manove 2009). 
Despite these caveats, it appears that controlling for dimensions of skill not generally 
accounted for in empirical exercises, such as whatever it is that the AFQT score captures, may 
affect the conclusions we draw about the presence of discrimination based on regression 
estimates. In particular, residual racial wage differences may simply reflect that available data 
simply do not allow us to control for all aspects of market-relevant skills carefully enough. At a 
minimum, Neal & Johnson’s results and related papers show that it will be important for future 
work seeking to measure discrimination with regression methods to collect and incorporate new 
data on skills, including more of the noncognitive aspects of skill, the value of which for labor 
market and other outcomes has been the focus of much recent work by Heckman and others 
(e.g., see Heckman et al. 2006). 
Another challenge confronted by regression-based estimates is best illustrated in the 
widely used Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition framework, which has a long history in studies of 
racial discrimination (see Blinder 1973; Corcoran & Duncan 1979; Neumark 1988; Oaxaca & 
Ransom 1994, 1998; Darity et al. 1996). Applications of this method relax the assumption in 
Equation 1 that the coefficient  on the control vector X  is constant across races and assume 
instead that the labor market outcome received by a person of a given race Bi may be 
represented by a race-specific regression 
  ,       0,1 ,
BB B
it B it it i yX B          ( 4 )  15 
where the constant term is subsumed in  X to focus the equations on explained differences in 
labor market outcomes. Because the regression line for each race passes through the means of y 
and X, the difference in observed wages between blacks  Bi 1   and whites  Bi  0   is given by 
E yit
1  yit
0      ˆ 1Xit
1  ˆ 0Xit
0  Xit
0 ˆ 1  ˆ 0   ˆ 1 Xit
1  Xit
0     (5) 
or 
   
10 1 0 1 1 0
10 1 0 0 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , it it it it it it it Ey y X X X X X              (6) 
where  ˆ  are the estimated regression coefficients. The expressions in Equations 5 and 6 show 
that mean explained labor market differentials between races can be decomposed into two 
pieces: one due to differences between blacks and whites in their observed characteristics 
the X's   and another due to differences in the prices that those observed traits receive in the 
labor market (the estimated 's). Because the benchmark neoclassical account of labor market 
outcome determination presumes that skills are treated equally, with no regard given to traits 
such as race with which they are correlated, a natural measure of discrimination in the 
importance of cross-race differences is the first term in either Equation 5 or 6. The part of the 
differential attributable to differences in  X is determined before agents enter the market and thus 
is strictly speaking not the object of interest in studies of labor market discrimination.
16 
Results from several studies using these decomposition methods have found evidence 
consistent with market discrimination, especially for black men. One reason for caution about 
these estimates is that they appear to depend critically on which of the decomposition 
expressions in Equation 5 or 6 is used. More fundamentally, however, whether decomposition-
style methods provide a convincing answer to the thought experiment “How would blacks fare if 
the distribution of traits they brought to the market were exactly the same as the distribution of 
traits brought by whites?” depends both on the degree to which the traits of blacks and whites 
overlap in the sample at hand and what we are willing to assume about the functional form 
mapping traits  X into the outcome y. 
If we are willing to assume that the effect of available traits on y is linear, then even if no 
blacks in the sample are observed to have the same values of the relevant traits as do whites, the 
decomposition exercise described above will still be valid. If, however, the effect of observed 16 
traits on the labor market outcome is highly nonlinear and of unknown functional form, then the 
decomposition exercise outlined above may not produce a valid answer to the thought 
experiment about equalizing the distribution of traits across races. Intuitively, this is because 
there will be values of  X  at which it is not possible to match blacks and whites.
17 
An illustration of the misleading inferences that might be drawn from a naive application 
of decomposition methods with a linearity assumption is provided by Barsky et al. (2002). These 
authors study how much of the racial wage gap can be attributed to differences in income and 
how much can be attributed to differences, across race, in how income is converted to wealth. 
They show that because incomes differ so dramatically across races, combined with the high 
nonlinearity of the effect of income on wealth, decompositions of the sort typically used in 
discrimination work may produce underestimates of the importance of differences in the 
distribution of income. Although Barsky et al. do not focus on labor market discrimination, the 
problems they highlight may well be relevant to the use of decompositions to infer the role of 
discrimination in racial wage gaps. Because the distributions of many measures of skill, such as 
test scores, differ quite substantially by race, and probably affect wages and other labor market 
outcomes in ways that are highly complicated and almost certainly nonlinear, estimates of 
discrimination that come from decomposition exercises may in fact be speculative. 
2.5. Is There Consensus About Existing Discrimination? 
Given these various concerns, it is reasonable to ask whether there are any facts about racial 
labor market discrimination on which the literature has converged. There is indeed a large, well-
documented gap in wages and earnings between black and white men. Much of this gap remains 
after controlling for education and potential experience. This gap narrowed significantly in the 
years preceding and following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Smith & Welch 1989, Donohue & 
Heckman 1991, Chay 1995). This narrowing then stalled beginning in the early 1980s and has 
remained fairly stable in the years since (Bound & Freeman 1992, Altonji & Blank 1999). 
Besides differences in completed education, there are also large differences by race in 
measures of ability on things such as test scores. The well-known paper by Neal & Johnson 
(1996) finds that controlling for the score on the AFQT taken prior to entry to the labor market 
eliminates two-thirds of the wage gap for racial minorities, but as noted above, recent work finds 
that the usual gaps reappear in regressions that control for both AFQT score and measures of 17 
completed schooling. These findings point to the existence of nontrivial wage gaps that are not 
attributable to skill differences, suggesting the presence of significant racial discrimination in 
wages. 
The vast majority of the racial discrimination literature focuses on comparisons of black 
and white men, largely because comparisons of black and white women are complicated by 
selection issues arising from differential marriage and fertility. Differences in wages between 
black and white women that do not control for selection are typically smaller than those observed 
for men, but Neal (2004) shows that once differential selection is accounted for, wage 
differences between black and white women are at least as large as for men. 
The literature focuses on wages, but there have also historically been very large racial 
gaps in unemployment and labor force participation rates (Stratton 1993, Fairlie & Sundstrom 
1997). Compared with the literature on wages, much less work has been done to investigate 
whether differences in these other outcomes are accounted for by differences in observable 
measures of skill or from discrimination. The much smaller focus on employment gaps in 
empirical work mimics the theoretical literature, which has generally concentrated on wages. We 
turn next to a discussion of the difficulties associated with empirically determining what 
theoretical models best account for such labor market discrimination as it exists. 
3. TESTING MODELS OF DISCRIMINATION 
There is a large theoretical literature on labor market discrimination, including a number of 
papers of considerable technical complexity and sophistication. Given the aims of this article, we 
do not review the details of these models, as is done in Lang & Lehmann’s (2010) recent review. 
We concentrate instead on the fact that each of the various theoretical models in the literature 
features one of a small number of arguments. We briefly describe the essence of those arguments 
and discuss the key empirical predictions forthcoming from the models that employ them. We 
then discuss efforts to empirically test theoretical models of discrimination, pointing out both 
fundamental challenges and what we consider recent advances. 
3.1. The Two Main Types of Discrimination Models 
Broadly speaking, theoretical models of discrimination in economics can be split into two types. 
The point of departure of prejudice models is that some persons have a negative feeling—an 18 
antipathy or aversion—toward persons of another race.
18 Of course, the idea that negative cross-
racial feeling might exist and probably has something to do with the historically poor life 
circumstance of (especially) blacks did not originate with economists. However, in work that is 
widely credited with starting the discrimination literature in economics, Becker (1971 [1957]) 
formalizes this negative feeling and demonstrates how its presence among different types of 
white market actors might translate into discriminatory labor market outcomes for blacks in 
competitive settings. 
Becker represents negative cross-racial sentiment as a disutility from cross-racial 
interaction.
19 He separately considers prejudice among three different types of market actors—
employers, coworkers, and customers. Because it is modeled as disutility from interacting with 
blacks, prejudice operates effectively as sort of a psychic price, or cost, incurred by a prejudiced 
person when interacting with blacks. This psychic cost is added to the pecuniary cost or benefits 
that otherwise characterize the interaction. Thus a prejudiced employer incurs a total cost of 
employing a black worker equal to the wage paid to that person plus the employer’s prejudice; a 
prejudiced coworker receives a total benefit from working alongside a black person at a 
particular job equal to the wage he receives at that job minus his prejudice; and a prejudiced 
customer pays a total price for a product bought from a black seller given by the money price of 
the product plus the customer’s prejudice. Because cross-racial contact is likely most unpleasant 
to the most-prejudiced whites, they pay a higher psychic price in cross-racial interactions than do 
relatively unprejudiced whites. Indeed, whites who are totally unprejudiced pay no psychic price 
at all from cross-racial interactions. 
This simple, intuitively appealing formulation produces a number of interesting 
implications, perhaps best illustrated with the employer-prejudice example. Assuming blacks and 
whites to be perfect substitutes in production, an employer with prejudice dj  0 chooses black 
and white labor   and  ba LL  to maximize 
 ,, ja b a a b b j b Uf K L Lw L w L d L           ( 7 )  
where  f  is a constant returns to scale production function, and wb and wa are the wages for 
black and white labor, respectively. The employer simply hires the type of labor that is least 
costly to her, meaning that she will hire only blacks if  bja wd w    and will hire only whites if 19 
the strict inequality is reversed. The employer’s workforce will be racially segregated only if her 
prejudice and prevailing wages are such that wb  dj  wa. 
In the short run, when the number and size of firms are fixed, it is easy to see that some 
blacks will be employed first by the least-prejudiced employers, then others by the next least 
prejudiced, and so forth until all blacks are employed. If the distribution of prejudice among 
employers is smooth, the last employer to hire blacks will be just indifferent between hiring 
blacks and whites at prevailing wages. In equilibrium there is market clearance, and the wage 
gap observed in equilibrium between blacks and whites, wa
*  wb
*, is implicitly given by the 
prejudice 
*
j d  of the last employer—what Becker calls the marginal discriminator. 
Two key results follow from this reasoning. First, the equilibrium racial wage gap will 
not be determined by the mean level of prejudice among all employers in the market. Because 
market pressures sort blacks away from the most-prejudiced persons, wage gaps will be 
determined by the most-prejudiced employers with whom blacks interact. In fact, even if there 
are hugely prejudiced employers in a given market, if there are also enough totally unprejudiced 
employers  dj  0   relative to the number of blacks, there will be no wage differential suffered 
by blacks in the short run. More generally, if blacks are a small minority in the labor market, 
only the prejudice in the left tail of the prejudice distribution matters for wage determination; 
prejudice at the 90th percentile of the prejudice distribution, for example, should be irrelevant as 
blacks will likely not interact with these persons in equilibrium. 
The second result has to do with the ameliorative role of segregation on wage gaps. 
Because wage gaps ultimately derive from blacks having to interact with prejudiced whites, if 
the market operates in such a fashion that they could be isolated from such interactions—if the 
market were segregated by race—there will be no racial wage gap. 
The basic intuition and key implications of the short-run version of the coworker version 
of Becker’s model are quite similar: If the source of racial animus is coworkers rather than 
employers, and white and blacks workers can be perfectly segregated, there will be no wage 
difference among equally productive blacks and whites. If impediments to segregation are such 
that blacks and prejudiced whites must work together, the firm must pay whites forced to work 
with blacks a wage premium for doing so. Cost-conscious firms thus will tend to sort black 20 
workers to ensure that they pay the smallest possible values of these premia—meaning that 
observed wage gaps will depend on the least-prejudiced whites with whom blacks are forced to 
interact as coworkers. In the customer prejudice case, whites who dislike buying goods made or 
sold by blacks will be willing to pay less for such goods, leading to a reduction in black relative 
wages. Acting in the other direction, whites who do not care about the race of the seller are 
willing to pay the same price for the good irrespective of the seller’s race. Black producers have 
an incentive to sell to unprejudiced customers, and prejudiced customers will choose to purchase 
from white producers if prices are equal. If there are enough unprejudiced customers, black 
sellers need not sell at lower prices to attract prejudiced customers, and their wages are not 
correspondingly reduced. Equilibrium outcomes should again be determined by behavior at the 
margin. 
Despite their interesting implications, two things about the neoclassical versions of 
prejudice (or taste-based) models of discrimination have long concerned economists. One is the 
long-standing unease among economists about theoretical arguments that hinge on changes to 
some part of the utility function. For example, the results from the standard employer 
discrimination models depend on firms maximizing something other than profit, because of the 
tastes of people running firms. The assumption that competitive firms maximize profit is central 
in neoclassical economics, so models in which it is seemingly assumed away—as in prejudice 
models—are in some sense unsatisfying, however interesting or intuitively appealing their 
implications. 
The other concern about prejudice models (at least in their competitive form) is that, for 
some time, it was not obvious that the predictions of the model survive long-run competition. 
Employers who discriminate lose profits in the Becker model. Arrow (1973), extending a point 
made by Becker himself, stressed that if there were enough potential employers with no 
prejudice, or if existing employers with no prejudice extended their operations, wage differences 
would ultimately disappear in the long run as these employers hired available black workers. 
Later work has shown that, even in a competitive environment, what Arrow predicts need not 
arise if racial feeling takes the form of positive tastes for one group rather than animus toward 
another, or if attention were paid to the racial environment prejudiced employers would confront 
once they shut down (see Goldberg 1982 for a discussion of how taste discrimination based on 21 
nepotism might survive long-run competition).
20 In addition, a variety of models have shown 
how wage discrimination arising from racial prejudice can survive when there is search.
21 
These various models reproduce many (although not always all) of the key insights of the 
basic Becker formulation. In particular, they tend to show that market forces sort the most 
racially prejudiced whites away from the objects of their prejudice and that how blacks fare in 
equilibrium should be a function of the most-prejudiced white with whom they are forced to 
interact in the relevant context. 
3.2. Statistical Discrimination Models 
The other types of models in the theoretical discrimination literature are statistical discrimination 
models. These models currently appear to be the most popular models among economists 
studying discrimination. Unlike prejudice models, statistical discrimination models do not 
presume up front that there is any negative racial sentiment on the part of employers. Rather, 
employers are typically represented as profit-maximizing agents who seek to hire the most able 
workers they can at prevailing wages. However, the nature of information is such that firms 
cannot accurately estimate workers’ skills or productivity, given observable indicators of skill, 
and are especially bad at doing this for black compared with white workers. The firm faces a 
signal extraction problem and relies on race and individual-level indicators of productivity to 
solve that problem. The choices made by firms in their hiring or wage-setting decisions are fully 
rational: Firms maximize (expected) profit, the initial or induced levels of skill investment by 
race are fully consistent with firm decisions, and vice versa. 
Early treatment of statistical discrimination models include Phelps (1972) and Arrow 
(1973), but perhaps the most complete early work is Aigner & Cain (1977). As with prejudice 
models, we quickly review this benchmark model as it represents the starting point for 
subsequent work in this area. Imagine that black  b   and white  a   workers apply for jobs. 
Workers are distinguished by their actual skill, or quality q, but firms only observe an error-
ridden version of that skill, say  q. Firms know the distribution of true skill by race; in particular, 
suppose that for persons of race x  a,b   it is known that 
qx ~  qx,q
2  ,         ( 8 )  22 
where  is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution. Finally, suppose that 
the error-ridden signal firms observe about a worker’s ability is an unbiased indicator of ability. 
Thus 
 qi  qi i          ( 9 )  
with the error of the signal, , distributed 
i ~  0,x
2  .         ( 1 0 )  
Firms pay wages equal to expected productivity, meaning that each person’s wage y is given by 























.     (11) 
Each worker receives a wage that is a weighted average of the mean level of skill in his 
group and of the worker’s level of the observed skill indicator, with weights that are functions of 
the variances in the unobserved skill and of the signal error. As the variance in the error of the 
signal falls relative to the variance in underlying skill (that is, as the signal becomes better), more 
weight is placed on the person’s own indicator; as the signal becomes noisier, more weight is 
placed on the mean level of skill in the person’s group. 
Several interesting results follow from the benchmark result (Equation 11). Notice first 
that firms will pay both blacks and whites wages that are on average equal to their mean 
productivity. What about the payment received by a given black or white worker? Suppose that 
the quality of the signal is the same for blacks and whites but that blacks are known to have 
lower average skill q , perhaps because of differences in educational opportunities. Then a black 
person will be paid less than a white person with the same value of the skill indicator,  q. Notice 
that in this case, a black and a white worker with the same observed skills receive different 
wages, but this stems from no negative sentiment on the firm’s part; it is the best decision the 
firm can make given its signal extraction problem. Notice also that the average difference in pay 
between blacks and whites is exactly equal to the racial difference in actual skills  qb  qa  . 
Interestingly, the most common case studied in the literature assumes that mean skill q  is 
the same across races, but the signal-to-noise ratio of the signal of skill differs between blacks 23 
and whites. In this case, because mean wages paid to a group equal mean group productivity, 
blacks and whites are paid the same on average. However, the differences in variances across 
races mean that the weight placed on group mean skill versus the indicator of own skill will be 
different for blacks and whites. It is usually assumed that signal quality is worse for blacks.
22 
This means that for blacks, compared with whites, more weight is given to the known mean 
productivity than to the individual skill indicator in Equation 11. Because wages are equal on 
average across races, blacks who are above the mean will be paid less than observationally 
similar whites, but for persons below the mean blacks should be paid more than observationally 
similar whites. 
Using the benchmark model above as a starting point, subsequent theoretical work has 
concentrated on its various dynamic implications. One focus has been on how the presence of 
statistical discrimination affects the decision to invest in latent and observable dimensions of 
human capital. Lundberg & Startz (1983) consider a situation in which blacks and whites 
initially have the same underlying, unobserved productivity  q   and face the same opportunity 
for investments that can augment it. Using the insight from Equation 11 that greater 
measurement error in the accuracy with which firms can judge black productivity makes the 
return to such investment smaller for blacks, they show that blacks will choose not to undertake 
productivity-enhancing investment. Coate & Loury (1993) further explore this issue. 
More recent work has raised questions about this well-known prediction of less human 
capital investment among blacks as a result of statistical discrimination. Lang & Manove (2009) 
observe that, unlike the assumption in previous work about skill investments being unobserved, 
key aspects of human capital, such as the amount or type of education, are observed by the 
market. Their model shows that, precisely because their productivity is more noisily assessed, 
blacks of any given ability have a greater incentive to engage in observable, verifiable 
investments such as schooling. In effect, education in the Lang & Manove framework lowers the 
error with which firms can judge black productivity (see also Arcidiacono et al. 2010 for closely 
related work). 
The other, more dynamic direction taken in recent theoretical work on statistical 
discrimination builds on insights first presented by Farber & Gibbons (1996) about how the labor 
market resolves uncertainty about worker productivity. Farber & Gibbons argue that, in any 24 
period, a worker’s wage equals her expected output in that period given all available information 
about her, including her previous levels of production.
23 Firms effectively learn increasingly 
more about a worker’s latent productivity over time by observing her various levels of output. 
Therefore, if there is a trait that is unobserved by the firm but observed by the analyst that is 
known to vary positively with ability, over time that trait should be an increasingly important 
determinant of wages. 
Altonji & Pierret (2001) build on this key result from Farber & Gibbons (see also 
Pinkston 2006, Lange 2007). Their argument is as follows. Suppose (as is plainly the case) that 
race is correlated with some measure of productivity that is unobserved to the market. Firms 
either might statistically discriminate based on race or they might not. If firms learn workers’ 
true productivity over time, as Farber & Gibbons suggest, the negative partial effect of race on 
wages should get smaller conditional on an interaction between race and time. And this 
interaction between race and time should itself have a negative partial effect on wages. If a 
worker’s wages are determined increasingly more by her realized productivity the longer she 
spends in the labor market, and if some aspect of a worker’s latent productivity is not accounted 
for in the process of initial wage setting (contrary to what would be true if the firm statistically 
discriminated using race), then conditional on an interaction between the latent (to the firm) 
measure of skill and time, the partial effect of race on wages should grow less negative over 
time. 
3.3. Testing Between Two Types of Theories 
The most fundamental challenge in empirically adjudicating between prejudice and statistical 
discrimination models is that they often predict the same outcomes. Our reading of the literature 
suggests that most tests in the literature, purporting to support or reject a particular type of 
model, are based on findings that are potentially explicable by some version of the other type of 
discrimination model. 
A few examples from papers we admire illustrate this point. A prediction of Borjas & 
Bronars’ (1989) model of customer prejudice with search is that the earnings of self-employed 
blacks will be lower than the earnings of comparable whites. And because the variance of returns 
to ability in self-employment is lower for high-ability black sellers than it is for high-ability 
whites, the variance in income among blacks across skill levels should be lower than for whites. 25 
Borjas & Bronars find support for these predictions in the data. However, it is easy to see that 
this set of results could be the result of some other model, including one with the flavor of 
statistical discrimination. For example, if customers had no prejudice whatsoever, but knew that 
there was some difference in mean quality of goods made or sold by blacks, and offered prices 
for goods based on statistical discrimination in light of that knowledge or belief, we suspect that 
the predictions would be exactly the same as the ones Borjas & Bronars test and confirm. In our 
view, a similar sort of exercise can be done for most models that indirectly test prejudice models. 
Taking an example in the other direction, we discuss above that an implication of 
statistical discrimination is that the greater error with which their true productivity is revealed 
should have an effect on blacks’ willingness to invest in human capital. As noted, this insight is 
explored to different conclusions by Lundberg & Startz and by Lang & Manove. Of course, 
another reason that blacks might expect lower rewards for their human capital is simply that 
firms may discriminate against blacks because of prejudice. Nor does that prejudice have to be 
the same for all types of skill; firms may especially like or dislike uneducated blacks, which 
makes education either a protection against or an invitation to prejudiced labor market 
treatment.
24 The point is that evidence of the propensity of a larger or smaller human capital 
investment among blacks compared with whites is possibly explicable by either type of 
discrimination model. 
As these examples demonstrate, most empirical exercises in the literature simply do not 
convincingly test between discrimination models. An approach that we believe offers some 
promise would be to analyze directly the two quite different mechanisms that the two types of 
models emphasize. Ideally this direct evidence would employ persuasive research designs, 
including exogenous variation in prejudice or in information. Even if this is not possible, it may 
still be possible to study associations involving prejudice or information that should be observed 
in the data if a particular model matters for racial labor market outcomes. 
There are, of course, challenges to this direct approach. Measures of the negative racial 
sentiment that economic agents actually feel are not widely available, and available measures 
may not perfectly match the notion of prejudice in the model. How information affects people’s 
expectations is a central part of statistical discrimination stories, but economists know little about 
how people form expectations in the real world and have only recently started to formally 26 
explore how to measure them carefully (see Manski 2004 for a discussion about research on 
expectations). Finally, a given study might face the challenge of external validity—that the 
findings in the particular scenario studied do not generalize to the labor market more broadly. 
Despite these problems, examples of this direct approach have appeared in the recent literature. 
We discuss three below. 
Using experimental methods, List (2004) tries to distinguish between taste-based and 
statistical discrimination in the baseball card market. The paper is described by Lang & Lehmann 
(2010), consistent with our characterization of this challenge in the literature, as “one of the few 
studies that attempt to identify the nature of discrimination rather than its mere presence.” List 
recruited buyers and sellers of a particular, highly valued baseball card at a baseball card show. 
He finds that there was a significant price differential in the initial offer made for a card if the 
seller or buyer was a racial minority, with greater discrimination among sellers. Final 
transactions, after the buyer and seller had negotiated for a while, revealed much less 
discrimination. Among experienced buyers, there is little evidence of discrimination at all, 
although racial minorities had to expend more effort (that is, negotiate longer) to overcome 
discrimination. 
List also runs a series of experiments. These include a dictator-game experiment in which 
he finds that, with the exception of white women, people were no more or less likely to share a 
transfer with someone of a different race. This suggests little racial animus among his subjects. 
He also ran a Chamberlain experiment in which buyers and sellers negotiated over the trade 
price. He finds that when sellers were told that reservation prices were randomly assigned, there 
was no difference in prices offered by race. By contrast, when they were not given this 
information and were thus unsure about sellers’ reservation prices, sellers systematically offered 
lower prices to minorities. 
This paper’s results suggest that—at least as far as the baseball card market is 
concerned—transactions seem to be based on statistical inference about how reservation prices 
vary by race, rather than on something having to do with racial animus. The other merits of the 
paper aside, the obvious concern about these results is that the particular context in which they 
apply might have limited implications for the labor market as a whole. 27 
A good example of a direct test of the central features of a statistical discrimination 
model is Autor & Scarborough (2008). Limited information is the key mechanism in statistical 
discrimination models: It is because they do not perfectly observe worker’s abilities that firms 
rely on indicators such as race and place differential weight, by race, on the noisy indicators of 
productivity they do observe. Autor & Scarborough investigate what happens to the employment 
outcomes of blacks and whites when employers are provided with better information about the 
future productivity of potential workers, in the form of a new and better signal of worker ability. 
A model based on statistical discrimination suggests that this new information should have two 
effects on black outcomes. If the new signal is informative of productivity, highly productive 
black workers should benefit from the newly available information. However, if blacks score 
worse on average on the new employment screen, employers may shift hiring away from blacks 
and toward whites. Autor & Scarborough call this a trade-off between equity and efficiency. 
They show that the size of the latter effect depends not on the level of bias in the new 
information screen, but rather on the relative bias in the new information screen compared with 
the bias in employers’ beliefs about productivity prior to the introduction of the new information. 
They study the effect of new information using the example of the introduction of a 
computer-scored personality test into the hiring process at a firm. The scores on the personality 
test likely correlate well with productivity in this industry, and knowing these scores represents a 
marked improvement on the information previously available to firms about potential hires. 
Autor & Scarborough test their various predictions using a quasi-experimental research design. 
The firm they study has over 1,000 establishments, which introduce the test to the hiring process 
at different times over the course of a year. They take advantage of high-frequency personnel 
records and the differential timing of test introduction across establishments to estimate the 
effect of the test’s introduction on the productivity of black hires and on the fraction of new hires 
that are black. Unfortunately, the only available measure of worker productivity is the length of 
the employment spell. 
The results demonstrate that the introduction of the test leads to increases in employee 
tenure by 10%–12% among both whites and blacks. Better information (or a reduction in the 
error with which firms can project a worker’s productivity) increases productivity among 
workers hired. Interestingly, despite the fact that black applicants score significantly worse on 
the test, its introduction into the hiring process does not have any noticeable effect on the 28 
fraction of new hires that are black. This is a nice and rare example of a paper motivated by the 
important implications of a given discrimination model, which then tests the central mechanism 
of the model using a quasi-experimental research design. 
A third example of this sort of empirical work is our own (Charles & Guryan 2008). We 
devote extra space to a discussion of some questions it raises both because we are the authors 
and because the paper’s findings and its effort to directly test the key implication about the most 
simple prejudice model are not elsewhere present in the discrimination literature. 
The test of the prejudice model in Charles & Guryan (2008) (henceforth CG) does not 
exploit exogenous variation in prejudice. Instead, the paper focuses on testing whether key 
associations between prejudice and wages implied by the Becker prejudice model are found in 
the data. The absence of these associations would tend to weaken support for the model, whereas 
their presence would point strongly toward an important role for the prejudice mechanism—
especially if the particular associations tested are not obvious and are unlikely to be implied by 
other types of models. Recall that an implication of the Becker model is that because the market 
sorts blacks away from the most-prejudiced whites, outcomes for blacks should systematically 
depend on the left tail of the white prejudice distribution, as blacks are a small minority of the 
population. CG argue that this particular prediction (that it is the prejudice of relatively 
unprejudiced whites in a market that matters for wages rather than, say, the mean or some higher 
percentile point such as the 90th) is a subtle and initially counterintuitive prediction of a Becker-
style prejudice model—the confirmation of which would lend credence to that model. 
The study uses data from the General Social Survey (GSS), which over several years asks 
a representative sample of whites a series of questions having to do with racial sentiment. How 
the person feels about interracial marriage or whether they would vote for someone black are 
examples of the type of question asked. As the paper notes, none of these questions perfectly 
captures Becker’s representation of prejudice as the disutility a person experiences from cross-
racial interaction. However, a person’s propensity to respond to them in a way consistent with 
having negative racial feelings probably correlates strongly with Becker’s construct. Using 
responses to the separate racial-sentiment questions, CG create an individual prejudice index 
among whites in a given state and identify different percentile points in that prejudice 
distribution, differentially by state. Because of sample-size considerations, we pool GSS 29 
observations over all years in the data to measure various percentiles of the distribution of 
prejudice in each state. 
Using data from the 1977–2002 CPS, the paper then relates the average residual wage 
gap experienced by blacks in a state to the 10th, median, and 90th percentile of the white 
prejudice distribution in that state. Consistent with the Becker prediction, these results and other 
specifications consistently show that wage gaps are related to prejudice in the left tail of the 
distribution, but not to the level of median prejudice or prejudice at higher percentiles. Although 
not central to the analysis, given the percentile results, we also construct a measure of what the 
prejudice of the marginal discriminator is likely to be. Here too we follow the original Becker 
formulation, which argues that under a particular set of assumptions, this marginal person will be 
closely approximated by the p-th percentile of the white prejudice distribution if blacks 
constitute some percentage p of the workforce. We find that wage gaps are indeed systematically 
related to the prejudice of this marginal white, although the fit of these models varies across 
specifications. 
Segregation features prominently in the Becker framework, and we test and confirm its 
main implication: that racial wage gaps should be negatively related to the fraction of blacks in 
the state. Using data from the National Longitudinal Education Study, we construct a measure of 
how much whites interact with blacks at work. Perhaps contrary to simple intuition, but 
consistent with the Becker formulation of prejudice, we find that greater racial integration in a 
state’s workforce is associated with larger wage gaps. Moreover, we show that this estimated 
effect of greater integration is reduced when the regression controls for the prejudice of the 
marginal discriminator or the prejudice at the 10th percentile. This last finding is consistent with 
the reasoning in the Becker framework that the identity of the marginal discriminator depends on 
the extent to which the labor market can be segregated, and with Becker’s idea that segregation 
and wage discrimination essentially substitute for each other. 
We view these results as strongly supportive of the essential argument in the Becker 
prejudice model and consider them all the more important because these key predictions of that 
venerable model had not, to our knowledge, been previously tested. Several questions that might 
be raised about the results are directly addressed in the paper,
 but more recent results from the 
literature highlight two issues we use this opportunity to address.
25 30 
In a recent paper, Lang & Lehmann (2010) question whether the absence of a noticeable 
change over time in residual wage gaps is consistent with the decline in average prejudice over 
the past few decades.
26 Indeed, as Lang & Lehmann observe, evidence of a sharp decline over 
time in average prejudice can be found in the fact that the nation recently elected its first black 
president, overcoming in the process generations of bias.
27 The CG analysis does not address this 
important question; indeed, because of data constraints, the paper cannot definitely speak to how 
trends in residual wage gaps relate to prejudice changes within states. The paper mainly exploits 
cross-sectional variation, mostly because so few persons were asked about their prejudice by the 
GSS in a given state in a particular year that is difficult to accurately estimate different percentile 
points in a state’s prejudice distribution in a particular year. Moreover, as the paper shows, there 
is almost no difference across regions in the decline in average prejudice over the time period 
studied. 
The question Lang & Lehmann raise does suggest one exercise not done by CG. The key 
implication of the model CG test is that changes in mean prejudice among all whites in the 
country are not what should matter for national changes in black wages; changes in the prejudice 
of the marginal white are what should matter. We show here changes in the different percentile 
points in the distribution of white prejudice over the entire country, in which the numbers are 
created using the same method as in Charles & Guryan (2008). Figure 1 shows that, although 
there has been a decline at all parts of the overall national prejudice distribution, the decline has 
been largest for the highest levels of prejudice: The persons at the 90th or 75th percentile of state 
distributions of prejudice among whites are on average much less prejudiced compared with 30 
years ago. At lower percentile points in the distribution—that is, among whites with whom 
blacks might be expected to interact given the sorting implied by the prejudice model—the 
decline in prejudice over the past few decades has been much smaller. These patterns suggest 
that, even in the face of a decline in mean prejudice shown by both Lang & Lehmann and CG, 
persistent residual wage gaps are consistent with the fact that the prejudice of the marginal white 
person over the entire country has changed relatively little. 
Another question prompted by recent results concerns the role of the South in CG’s 
results. From the most recent reports from the Census Bureau, blacks have been moving to the 
South more than to any other region. And other recent work shows that there has been greater 
racial wage convergence in the South than in other regions (Vigdor 2006). Yet evidence for an 31 
important role for prejudice in wage determination from CG comes, to a large degree, from 
comparisons between Southern states and the rest of the country. How can we reconcile these 
two sets of results—the CG results, on one hand, which appear to emphasize the greater 
prejudice of the South, and wage convergence and migration patterns, on the other hand, which 
suggest, at a minimum, sharply declining Southern prejudice relative to other areas? 
The first response to this question is that although Southern/non-Southern differences do 
contribute importantly to the CG results, the paper also shows that the main results are 
qualitatively reproduced in a sample restricted to only Southern states. Also, CG show that 
although average prejudice has declined in the South, mirroring the decline in the rest of the 
country, the South remains the most-prejudiced region in the country. For consistency with the 
Becker model, the greater wage convergence over time in the South would have to coincide with 
greater convergence in the South of prejudice in the left tail of the distribution compared with 
other percentile points. Figure 2 presents this analysis, which was not done by CG. The figure 
shows that most of the convergence in the South’s prejudice did in fact occur in the left tail of 
the prejudice distribution. To account for the sample size issues discussed above, percentiles of 
the prejudice distribution are calculated by state and by year, and then the average is taken across 
all states in a Census region (i.e., South, Northeast, Midwest, West) in a year. The figures are 
noisy for the sample-size reasons noted above, but they seem to clearly show that convergence in 
the left tail of the prejudice distribution (the 10th and 25th percentiles) has been larger than that 
at the mean or in the right tail (the 90th percentile). 
4. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Despite the various problems outlined above, new research about racial discrimination continues 
to appear in the literature. Some of this work has not been about the labor market but has used 
reasoning in which statistical discrimination arguments feature prominently. For example, in a 
previous volume in this series, Persico (2009) describes the active body of work on racial 
profiling (see also Knowles et al. 2001, Antonovics et al. 2005, Anwar & Fang 2006, Sanga 
2009). The striking thing about these papers, and work such as Altonji & Pierret (2001) on 
learning in the labor market, is that they use some variant of the statistical discrimination model 
to identify sharp and transparent predictions about conditional means or associations that ought 
to be observed in the data if the model is correct, and that should not be true otherwise. They 32 
then test these predictions. As another example, Card et al. (2008) test a key prediction of 
Schelling’s (1971) model about neighborhood racial makeup in the presence of preferences for 
being close to a neighbor of the same race that could not be true were the basic theory not valid. 
The style employed in these papers is similar to the CG approach for studying prejudice. We 
think many key predictions of the most basic versions of prejudice and statistical discrimination 
models about labor market discrimination remain to be tested using a similar approach and hope, 
and expect, to see papers attempting this work in the future. 
In empirical economics more generally, there has been a notable increase in the number 
of papers employing experimental methods, whether in a lab or in the field. Above we discuss 
papers using this approach both to identify discrimination in the labor market (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004) and to test between explanations for its sources (List 2004). A closely 
related set of papers looks at discrimination in the quasi-experimental settings provided by game 
shows (Levitt 2004, Antonovics et al. 2005). What these studies sacrifice in terms of possible 
external validity is made up for by the transparency and persuasiveness of their research designs. 
We suspect that many other similar papers, hopefully focusing on labor market outcomes, will be 
forthcoming in the literature. 
There is growing output from the theoretical side of the discrimination literature. Recent 
models, centering on beliefs and information as statistical discrimination models do, have 
yielded interesting results about subjects such as belief flipping, evolutionary statistical 
discrimination, and stereotypes (e.g., Coate & Loury 1993; Loury 2002, 2006; Fryer 2007; Levin 
2009). All these theoretical efforts represent a long-overdue effort to think deeply about the 
source of erroneous racial stereotypes, and how beliefs evolve. However, because few, if any, of 
their predictions have been tested in the data, there are opportunities for new empirical work on 
these questions in the future. 
There are also new ideas about the nature of prejudice in the literature. Some recent work 
studies the difference between explicit and implicit prejudice (Greenwald et al. 1998, Bertrand et 
al. 2005). In a similar vein, Price & Wolfers (2010) estimate the differential treatment of white 
and black NBA basketball players by referees of different race. Price & Wolfers attribute the 
differences they observe to subconscious split-second decision making, which suggests a more 
nuanced type of prejudice than Becker’s notion of a willingness to pay a price to avoid 33 
interaction. Other work examining the different ways that explicit and implicit prejudice affects 
markets is likely to be forthcoming in the literature. 
Economists thus far have spent little time exploring the sources of prejudice, such as 
whether it derives from battles over economic resources, whether it indicates a preference toward 
in-group members or distaste directed at out-group members, or how and why it is affected by 
things such as education. Although Becker's formulation of prejudice as distaste for cross-racial 
interaction has offered great insights into the way that racial feelings may create discriminatory 
outcomes for minorities, there may be fresh insights to be gleaned from the large body of work in 
social psychology that studies both the form and sources of racial prejudice (see Charles & 
Guryan 2009 for discussion). As economic theorists engage with work such as Fiske (1998), the 
classic studies of Allport (1954) and Tajfel (1981), and the famous robber's cave study by Sherif 
et al. (1988 [1961]), there may be fresh insights into ways to test for the importance of prejudice 
in labor markets. As all these examples show, despite the difficulty of establishing definitive 
evidence about whether discrimination exists at all, or why it does, there are many avenues for 
creative work in the future. 
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1Because of our focus on racial discrimination in the labor market, we do not discuss the large 
literature on discrimination in other markets (such as the market for housing) or labor market 
discrimination against other disadvantaged groups (such as women). Nonetheless, many 
arguments we make about the challenges of doing convincing work about racial discrimination 
carry over closely to work in those other contexts. 
2The relative thinness of empirical research on discrimination against other types of racial 
minorities has been long lamented (see Altonji & Blank 1999). One reason for the paucity of 
research on discrimination against other minority groups (or by one minority group toward 
another) is that, unlike blacks and whites, for whom such data have always been collected, 
disaggregated data for other racial groups have not been consistently coded in the large data sets 
typically used by economists. This situation will hopefully change in the future, as scholars make 
use of the new, richer racial information now available on surveys such as the U.S. Census. 
3Other types of discrimination models that have appeared in the literature often incorporate one 
of the insights central to these two classes of models. For example, in Black’s (1995) model, 
discriminatory treatment derives from local monopsony power enjoyed by incumbent employers. 
In this framework, the fact that some firms enjoy differential monopsony power over black and 
white workers arises because of the presence of employers whose racial prejudice is such that 
they do not hire black workers at all (see also Sasaki 1999 and Bowlus & Eckstein 2002 for 
models with search and prejudice). 
4Altonji & Blank (1999) use the expression direct evidence to mean something different than we 
do here. Although it is not defined in their paper, from the context it is clear that they use the 
expression to refer to persuasive empirical evidence about the existence of discrimination. Here 
we use the term direct to mean a focus on the mechanism implied by the particular model. 
5Even if there are heterogeneous discrimination effects, the parameter   from the formulation in 
Equation 1 measures the average labor market discrimination experienced by blacks in the 
sample. 
6The historical differences in the quality of the schooling received by blacks and whites (Card & 
Krueger 1992) represent a likely source of unmeasured differences in productivity. 42 
7The mapping from physical traits to race is not perfect. Many people who are commonly 
understood to belong to different racial groups share similar physical features. Likewise, many 
blacks in the United States differ so widely with respect to these same markers that their hair 
texture or skin color would assure that they would not be considered black in other parts of the 
world or perhaps even in the United States at other points in time. 
8In studies of racial discrimination based on superficial identification, such as whether the police 
are more likely to pull over “black” motorists on the freeway, it obviously matters a great deal 
for our conclusions about the extent of discriminatory treatment if the persons describing 
themselves as black in the sample would not have been thought so by a third party based on 
casual inspection. 
9This change in the way that race is coded in the CPS carries over from a fundamental change in 
how the U.S. Census asked people about their racial identification beginning with the 2000 
Census. 
10This is the familiar argument about there being attenuation bias if the regressor of interest is 
randomly mismeasured. 
11Some treatments might be conceptually amenable to experimental manipulation but would still 
never be conducted because of moral considerations. The case of the health effects of smoking is 
a famous example in which the current consensus about the adverse causal effects of smoking 
has been established through the careful gathering of observational data rather than from purely 
experimental evidence. 
12Although not experimental in nature, there is a literature that measures wage and other labor 
market differences by skin tone (see, e.g., Goldsmith et al. 2007). These results document 
penalties for darker-skinned individuals, but because the results are observational in nature, there 
are the usual concerns about possible unmeasured differences in productivity-relevant traits, 
including differences in family background. 
13Goldin & Rouse (2000) exploit an exogenous change in knowledge to measure the effects of 
discrimination against women. They study a change in symphony audition procedures, whereby 
candidates performed behind a screen and thus were not seen by jurors, rather than in the open as 
had previously been done. They find that female musicians are more likely to be hired when 43 
auditions were blind, when knowledge of gender was unknown to the relevant market actor. This 
study concerns gender discrimination, but one can easily imagine a similar methodology for 
identifying the effects of race on hiring or promotion. 
14In a different cultural context, Rubinstein & Brenner (2011) explore whether wage differences 
between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews in Israel result from discrimination. Comparing males 
born to Sephardic mothers and Ashkenazi fathers with those born to Ashkenazi mothers and 
Sephardic fathers, they show that wages are lower in the latter group despite the fact that they 
have more observable skills. The authors attribute this difference to the former primarily having 
Ashkenazi surnames and the latter primarily having Sephardic surnames. They also show that 
married women’s wages are related more strongly to the ethnicity of married women’s father-in-
law’s ethnicity than to their father’s ethnicity. 
15Bertrand & Mullainathan address these concerns by controlling on their résumés for standard 
measures of skill for the jobs in question and present some supportive data on birth-certificate 
data from Massachusetts to show that maternal background traits do not drive their results. 
However, the idea that certain types of names are correlated with traits that might otherwise 
affect labor market treatment is demonstrated by Fryer & Levitt (2004) in their work on black 
naming conventions among infants born in California. 
16This reasoning abstracts from the question of whether anticipated future discrimination affects 
people’s current human capital choices. Given the importance of skill differences, the interplay 
between expectations of future market discrimination and human capital investment decisions is 
an important area for future work. 
17Some recent applied econometrics work, following the important paper of DiNardo et al. 
(1996), uses some version of propensity-score-reweighting techniques to create counterfactual 
distributions of traits for use in decomposition exercises. This does not necessarily totally get 
around the issue of fundamental noncomparability for wildly differing distributions. As DiNardo 
(2002) notes, “Extremely low (or high) values of the propensity score are a potential problem. 
Intuitively, if the propensity score for having received the treatment is very small, this means that 
there are none (or few) treatment observations that look like the corresponding ‘control’ 
observation.” 
18Most economic models are silent about the sources of racially prejudicial sentiments. 44 
19The particular representation adopted by Becker for prejudice, which also has been followed by 
later writers, is merely one of several plausible alternatives. For example, a review of racial 
history in the United States and elsewhere indicates that even whites with the most racist 
sentiments were often comfortable interacting with blacks—so long as a particular hierarchical 
relationship governed the interaction. We are unaware of any model that incorporates this notion 
of hierarchy into its representation of prejudice. 
20Charles & Guryan (2007, 2008) point out that many employers who shut down would have to 
become employees elsewhere. Presuming that their negative racial sentiments are carried with 
them to this new role, interaction with black coworkers (over whose hiring they have no control) 
could bring disutility as large as the profit foregone by the refusal to hire blacks when they could 
control such hiring at their own firms. 
21Black (1995) shows in a simple search model that the presence of very prejudiced employers in 
the market, who would not hire blacks under any circumstances, generates monopsony power in 
those relatively unprejudiced firms who do hire blacks. Emphasizing potential differences in 
fixed costs of operation, Black shows how prejudiced firms can survive long-run competition. 
Bowlus & Eckstein (2002) extend Black’s model in a variety of important ways. Lang et al. 
(2005) present an interesting model of directed search in which firms announce wages and hire 
the most productive person among persons applying for the job. Because of prejudice, no black 
person gets a job to which a white has applied. In the equilibrium of their model, firms either (a) 
post a higher wage and hire only the white workers who apply or (b) post a lower wage and 
choose from among black applicants. Their model suggests that durable wage gaps can derive 
from the existence of relatively low levels of prejudice. 
22Greater variance in the quality of black schooling is one justification for this assumption, but it 
may also be the case that differences in cultural characteristics such as language may also make 
it more difficult for employers to understand blacks than whites (see Lang 1986 and Grogger 
2008 for work on race, language, and communication problems). 
23Farber & Gibbons make the strong but important assumption that the full vector of worker 
productivity is publicly observed. 
24The idea that prejudiced persons may feel differently toward different types of blacks is 
captured in the old expression “uppity black” and the more durable “lower-class black.” If the 45 
prejudiced persons especially dislike uneducated blacks, blacks may invest more in education 
compared with whites of similar skill, not because education lowers the error with which a 
statistically discriminating firm can judge a person’s productivity, but because blacks wish to 
avoid prejudice-based negative treatment. 
25For example, in robustness exercises, Charles & Guryan (2008) address concerns about 
differences in observed ability across regions by directly controlling for the difference in school 
quality, by race, across regions. They also instrument for the share of the current workforce that 
is black in a state in two-stage least squares analyses to address concerns about the possible 
endogeneity of this variable. 
26Using the responses to the some of the individual racial-sentiment questions in the GSS, Lang 
& Lehmann present a graph that reproduces the basic pattern CG show in a graph with their 
unidimensional index: that average racial prejudice has fallen substantially in the United States 
over the past 30 years. Both CG and Lang & Lehmann presume that responses to these questions 
are accurate reflections of people’s feelings. It is possible, of course, that all that has declined is 
people’s willingness to report their true racial sentiment. This would not mean that the measures 
would be without meaning: If it is indecorous to say one is racist, someone who gives what 
would widely be viewed as racist answers to these questions is likely quite prejudiced. 
27It bears mentioning here that the taxonomical challenge mentioned above in which race is 
concerned applies to our statements about Barack Obama. Based purely on his ancestry, there is 
as much logical reason for our saying that the nation recently elected its first black president as 
there is for saying that it elected its 44th white one. 
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Figure 1: Trends in various percentiles of racial prejudice in the United States measured 
using data from the General Social Survey in certain years between 1977 and 1996.  
To calculate the 10th percentile of prejudice in the United States in a given year, the 10th 
percentile is first calculated for each state in that year. The weighted average is then taken for 
that year across all states, where the weight is the state population from the 1990 census. Each of 




Figure 2 Trends in various measures of racial prejudice calculated from General Social 
Survey data for each of the four census regions in various years between 1977 and 1996.  
To calculate the 10th percentile of prejudice in a region in a given year, the 10th percentile is 
first calculated for each state in that year. The weighted average is then taken for that year across 
states within a census region, where the weight is the state population from the 1990 census. 
Each of the other measures (25th percentile, average, and 90th percentile) is calculated 
analogously. Abbreviations: MW, Midwest; NE, Northeast; S, South; W, West. 48 
Table 1:  
Responses to multiple- and single-race questions in the Current Population Survey, 2002 and 2003 
   
Race report in 2002 (percent) 





White 98.14  6.66  28.77  11.20 
Black 0.48  91.36  1.83  0.84 
American 
Indian/Aleut/Eskimo 
0.23 0.27  54.55  0.20 
Asian/Pacific Islander  0.28  0.35  1.42  75.22 
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander  0.05 0.08  0.25  5.94 
White-Black 0.09  0.35  0.00  0.05 
White–American 
Indian/Aleut/Eskimo 
0.58 0.01  13.01  0.08 
White-Asian 0.09  0.02  0.00  1.57 
White-Hawaiian 0.03  0.00  0.00  1.12 
Black–American 
Indian/Aleut/Eskimo 
0.01 0.59  0.08  0.00 
Black-Asian 0.00  0.05  0.00  0.10 
Black-Hawaiian 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03 
American 
Indian/Aleut/Eskimo-Asian 
0.00 0.01  0.00  0.00 
Asian-Hawaiian 0.00  0.00  0.00  1.80 
White-Black– American 
Indian/Aleut/Eskimo 
0.01 0.23  0.00  0.05 
White–American 
Indian/Aleut/Eskimo–Asian 
0.00 0.00  0.00  0.05 
White-Asian–Hawaiian 
Pacific Islander 
0.00 0.00  0.00  0.03 
White-Black–American 
Indian/Aleut/Eskimo –Asian 
0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Two or three races  0.01  0.00  0.08  1.60 
Four or five races  0.00 0.01  0.00  0.13 
        
Same as in 2002  98.14  91.36  54.55  75.22 
Different from 2002  1.86  8.64  45.45  24.78 
Note: Shown is the percent of respondents who gave each of four race answers in 2002 who then gave 
each of the possible race answers in 2003. Percentages sum to 100 in each column excluding the bottom 
two rows.  The bottom panel shows the fraction of respondents, by 2002 race, who gave the same and 
different answers in 2003 as in 2002. Calculations are from the 2002 and 2003 Current Population Survey 
(CPS) outgoing rotation groups. The sample includes all respondents who were in their fourth month in 
sample in 2002 and their eighth month in sample in 2003. Observations are matched across CPS months 
using household identifier and person line number. Observations are dropped from the analysis if they do 
not match gender and if age responses in the adjacent years do not differ by zero, one, or two years. 49 
Table 2: 
Relationship between indication of single race in 2003 and individual characteristics 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 Blacks  Whites 
Dependent variable:  Just black in 2003  Just white in 2003 
        
Log(wage)02  0.008  0.021  0.004 0.005 
 (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Log(wage)03 – Log(wage)02   0.023   0.002 
   (0.010)    (0.001) 
Education/10 0.040  0.056  0.012  0.011 
 (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Pot. experience/100  0.077  0.103  0.004  0.008 
 (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Pot. experience
2/100 0.002  0.002  0.000  0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R
2 0.005  0.006  0.002  0.002 
N  4,777 4,777  48,279  48,279 
Note: Shown are the results from four regressions, all based on data from the Current Population Survey 
outgoing rotation groups from 2002 and 2003. Regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 are restricted to 
those who self-indentified as being black in 2002. The dependent variable for the regressions reported in 
columns 1 and 2 is an indicator for whether the respondent reported his race as being black and black only 
in 2003. Regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 are restricted to those who self-identified as being white 
in 2002. The dependent variable for the regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 is an indicator for 
whether the respondent reported his race as being white and white only in 2003. In addition to the sample 
restrictions described in the text, regressions are further restricted to include only those observations with 
a valid wage in both 2002 and 2003.  
 